Rhonda N. Baird v. Joshua Gotbaum, Director, PBGC, No. 10-5421 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2011).
The D.C. Circuit today issued its decision in Baird v. Gotbaum, an appeal brought by an attorney employed at the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. The appeal was decided in less than six weeks. The court affirmed Judge Huvelle's grant of summary judgment on the retaliation and discrimination claims, but reversed on the hostile work environment claims. Critically, the court rejected Judge Huvelle's conclusion that a plaintiff could not use discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts to support a hostile work environment claim, even if those individual acts might not support a discrimination claim (the email below this one discusses this problem).
The decision is attached, and some excerpts follow:
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge:
Appellant Rhonda N. Baird, an African-American female attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), filed suit in district court against the PBGC, claiming employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The district court dismissed all her claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Baird v. Snowbarger, 744 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.D.C. 2010). We discuss only those that she appeals. They fall into two categories: first, claims of race and gender discrimination (Counts III and V), and of unlawful retaliation (Count I), arising out of four discrete episodes; second, a claim of a retaliatory hostile work environment (Count II) arising not only out of the four discrete episodes but also out of various other events as to which she raised claims that were time-barred (apart from their potential role in her hostile environment claim). . . .
. . . We affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims that rely on the four discrete episodes standing alone but vacate and remand as to the claim of retaliatory hostile work environment. . . .
Retaliatory hostile work environment.
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, "a plaintiff must show that his employer subjected him to 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). We have previously found that "a hostile work environment can amount to retaliation under Title VII" if the conduct meets that standard. See Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In evaluating Baird's retaliatory hostile work environment claim, the district court analyzed the four discrete episodes and concluded that Baird "[could not] satisfy [the Harris] test, because none of the acts that she alleges, whether considered alone or cumulatively, meets 'the demanding standards' for a hostile work environment claim." Baird, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (quoting Sewell v. Chao, 532 F. Supp. 2d 126, 141-42 (D.D.C. 2008)).
Baird argues on appeal that the district court erred in excluding two categories of acts from her hostile work environment claim: (1) actions as to which she filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission but which were timebarred, and (2) the underlying conduct that the PBGC allegedly failed to investigate and remedy. We discuss each in turn. . . .
. . . . Baird is clearly correct that the district court erred to the extent that it categorically excluded her time-barred complaints in considering the hostile work environment claim, thus failing to employ the Morgan analysis, including, of course, a determination of which acts exhibit the relationship necessary to be considered "part of the same actionable hostile environment claim." (2) Underlying acts. Baird additionally argues that the district court erred in considering only the PBGC's alleged failures to investigate various Workplace Rules violations, and not the underlying, uninvestigated conduct itself (without conceding that the latter must have been retaliatory itself in order for her allegations to state a claim). See Baird, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 294. The district court did so because, in its view, Baird failed to "allege that this underlying behavior (as opposed to defendant's response to this behavior) was due to [her] race, sex, or activity protected under Title VII." Id. (citing Franklin v. Potter, 600 F. Supp. 2d 38, 76 (D.D.C. 2009); Na'im v. Clinton, 626 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. 2009)). . . . But allegations of retaliatory intent are plainly present at least as to some of the underlying acts. . . .
. . . . Baird also raises a closely related argument. The district court suggested that a "plaintiff cannot rely on the discrete acts upon which she bases her discrimination and retaliation claims to support her hostile work environment claim." Baird, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 295; see also id. at 295-96 ("Because plaintiff's allegedly hostile events are the very employment actions she claims are retaliatory, she cannot so easily bootstrap allegedly retaliatory incidents into a broader hostile work environment claim." (quoting Franklin, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 76, with alterations)).
The district court and the cases on which it relies are correct to the extent they simply mean that acts giving rise to a hostile work environment claim must collectively meet the independent requirements of that claim (i.e., be "sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . ," Harris, 510 U.S. at 21), and must be adequately connected to each other (i.e., "all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice," Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122), as opposed to being an array of unrelated discriminatory or retaliatory acts. But we find no authority for the idea that particular acts cannot as a matter of law simultaneously support different types of Title VII claims, and of course, plaintiffs are free to plead alternative theories of harm that might stem from the same allegedly harmful conduct. Thus, although a plaintiff may not combine discrete acts to form a hostile work environment claim without meeting the required hostile work environment standard, neither can a court dismiss a hostile work environment claim merely because it contains discrete acts that the plaintiff claims (correctly or incorrectly) are actionable on their own.
. . . . We therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of Baird's retaliatory hostile work environment claim and remand for a determination of which, if any, acts should have been included under Morgan (and of course whether those acts satisfy Morgan). We express no opinion on whether the PBGC's motion to dismiss is ultimately meritorious or whether further proceedings involving discovery, etc., are appropriate.
The decision is available online at : http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/75E090314D975CC38525796500540481/$file/10-5421-1347265.pdf.
– submitted by Alan R. Kabat
Dupree v. D.C. Office of Employee Appeals and DC Dept. of Corrections , No. 09-CV-937 (D.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
The D.C. Court of Appeals held that it was reversible error for the D.C. Office of Employee Appeals Administrative Judge to decide a District employee's appeal without holding an evidentiary hearing, since there were contested factual issues, not purely legal issues:
A. Evidentiary Hearing
First, appellant claims that the ALJ should have conducted an evidentiary hearing "to adduce testimony to support the argument that the agency's termination action was flawed and contrary to law." The ALJ declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing because he determined that this matter could be decided based on the documentary evidence in the record. The regulations governing OEA hearings give the ALJ discretion 5 to conduct an evidentiary hearing, or to decide on the record.6 See 6-B DCMR § 625.1 and -.2 ("If the [ALJ] grants a request for evidentiary hearing, or makes his or her own determination that one is necessary, the [ALJ] will so advise the parties[.]") (emphasis added). However, our review of the administrative record reveals that the documents submitted in response to appellant's contentions obfuscated rather than clarified the material issues, rendering it very difficult to decide these issue on the record. The ALJ was made aware of these material issues in the appellant's initial notice of appeal (wherein he outlined three of the four issues he now appeals) and in his Opposition to Agency's Motion to Dismiss & Motion for a Closed Evidentiary Hearing.
This is not a case where appellant never raised material issues, and therefore the ALJ was not aware of the need for an evidentiary hearing. Cf. Anjuwan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Pub. Works, 729 A.2d 883, 885 (D.C. 1998) (affirming OEA's denial of an evidentiary hearing where appellant made no mention of the issue of retaliation even after the ALJ ordered the parties to identify the issues to be resolved in the case).
Neither is this a case where only questions of law are concerned, since factual determinations remain at issue for at least two of the four issues noted above. . . . We therefore conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the ALJ abused his discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
The case is available online at : http://www.dcappeals.gov/dccourts/appeals/pdf/09-sCV-937_MTD.PDF.
– submitted by Alan Kabat